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ABSTRACT 
 
This article focuses on whether the decrease in the oil price will result 
in insufficient security to cover escalating offshore decommissioning 
liabilities. The annual decommissioning security process requires the 
calculation of an amount of security in anticipation of decommissioning. 
This process takes place under decommissioning security agreements, 
whose aim is to provide mutual protection in case one party falls into 
financial difficulty. The funds are held in a trust until the decommissioning 
is completed. This article notes that disputes have begun to arise as to 
whether sufficient security has already been - or ought to now be - placed 
in trust. This article also considers the preferred dispute resolution 
mechanism for such disputes, namely expert determination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the first year in which the full impact of the oil price decrease 
has been factored into the annual decommissioning security process. 
Whether sufficient security has already been or ought to be placed in trust 
is an area raising significant concern in the industry. Against a backdrop of 
historic collaboration and practical co-operation, disputes about the 
calculation of the amount of security that ought to apply in anticipation of 
decommissioning have begun to arise. 
Decommissioning security agreements (DSAs) have evolved as a 
reaction to the extensive and continuing liability created by the Petroleum 
Act 1998 as amended by the Energy Act 2008. This regime provides that 
all current and former co-licensees will be jointly and severally liable for 
any decommissioning costs. DSAs were, if executed appropriately, to 
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provide the necessary mutual protection needed to ensure that, if one party 
to the DSA falls into financial difficulty, its security is called upon and the 
funds are held in a trust until the decommissioning is completed. 
This article focuses on whether the decrease in the oil price will result 
in insufficient security to cover escalating decommissioning liabilities. As 
a result of current market conditions, there has been an increase in requests 
for data, closer scrutiny of operator projections and a heightened risk of 
disputes about “net value” and “net costs”, which are normally resolved 
through expert determination. 
 
THE INCREASING FOCUS ON DECOMMISSIONING 
 
Decommissioning activity is gaining increasing momentum in the UK. 
The growth is clear from the increased number of major decommissioning 
projects underway which includes; the Murchison Field, for which the 
decommissioning programme was approved in 2014; the Brent Delta 
Platform for which the decommissioning programme was approved in 
2015; Thames Area for which decommissioning programmes were 
approved in 2015 and the Leadon Field for which decommissioning 
programmes were approved in 2016. In addition, a number of additional 
decommissioning programmes are under consideration, including the 
Viking Satellites CD, DD, ED, GD and HD. Oil & Gas UK has forecasted 
that the total decommissioning expenditure in the Central North Sea and 
the Northern North Sea/West of Shetland’s region has increased by £3 
billion with a total forecast for the industry of £16.9 billion over the 2015 
to 2024 timeframe1 
With revenue projections having fallen due to the oil price decrease and 
cessation of production (CoP) dates brought forward as a consequence, 
previously healthy-looking security balances may now seem marginal. 
 
DECOMMISSIONING SECURITY AGREEMENTS (DSAS) 
 
The primary requirements for decommissioning in UK waters are set 
out in the Petroleum Act 1998, as amended by the 2008 Act. 
                                                     
1 Oil & Gas UK, ‘Decommissioning Insight’ (Oil and Gas UK, 2015) 6 available  
at <http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/OP098.pdf> accessed 9 
November 2016. 
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Under sections 292 and 303 of the Petroleum Act 1998, the Secretary of 
State may, by written notice, make a wide set of participants connected with 
                                                     
2 Petroleum Act 1998, s 29(1) states: “The Secretary of State may by written notice 
require (a) the person to whom the notice is given; or (b) where notices are given 
to more than one person, those persons jointly, to submit to the Secretary of State 
a programme setting out the measures proposed to be taken in connection with the 
abandonment of an offshore installation or submarine pipeline (an ‘abandonment 
programme’)”. 
3 Petroleum Act 1998, s 30(1) states: “A notice under section 29(1) shall not be 
given to a person in relation to the abandonment of an offshore installation unless 
at the time when the notice is given he is within any of the following paragraphs 
(a) the person having the management of the installation or of its main structure; 
(b) a person to whom subsection (5) applies in relation to the installation; [(ba) a 
person to whom subsection (5)(a) and (b) applied in relation to the installation, but 
who— (i) transferred the right mentioned in that subsection to another person, and 
(ii) has not obtained a consent required under the licence in relation to the transfer;] 
(c) a person outside paragraphs (a) and (b) who is a party to a joint operating 
agreement or similar agreement relating to rights by virtue of which a person is 
within paragraph (b); (d) a person outside paragraphs (a) to (c) who owns any 
interest in the installation otherwise than as security for a loan; (e) a [body 
corporate] which is outside paragraphs (a) to (d) but is associated with a [body 
corporate] within any of those paragraphs”. 
S 30(5) of the Act states: “This subsection applies to a person in relation to an 
offshore installation if— [(a) the person has the right— (i) to exploit or explore 
mineral resources in any area, (ii) to unload, store or recover gas in any area or to 
convert any natural feature in any area for the purpose of storing gas, or (iii) to 
explore any area with a view to, or in connection with, the exercise of a right within 
sub-paragraph (i) or (ii), and] [(b) either— (i) any activity mentioned in subsection 
(6) is carried on from, by means of or on the installation, or (ii) the person intends 
to carry on an activity mentioned in that subsection from, by means of or on the 
installation,] or if he had such a right when any such activity was last so carried 
on…”. 
Petroleum Act 1998, s 30(6) states: “The activities referred to in subsection (5) 
are—  
[(a) the exploitation or exploration of mineral resources in the exercise of the 
right mentioned in subsection (5)(a);  
(aa) the unloading, storage or recovery of gas in the exercise of that right; (ab) 
the conversion, in the exercise of that right, of any natural feature for the purpose 
of storing gas;  
(ac) the exploration in exercise of that right with a view to, or in connection 
with, the exercise of a right within subsection (5)(a)(ii);]  
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or interested in a particular installation jointly and severally liable for all 
decommissioning costs of that installation.  
To deal with this extensive and overlapping liability, the industry has 
developed DSAs, whereby each participant agrees to deposit cash or, 
normally, another type of security, such as letters of credit, into a trust. That 
trust operates to pay the costs of decommissioning when the time comes. If 
a party falls into financial difficulty, the security provided is intended to be 
sufficient to cover that party’s share of decommissioning costs.  
Parties to a DSA include: 
 
1. First Tier Participants – this group will be composed of co-venturers 
under a joint operating agreement (JOA). Each member of this group 
will provide security for the upcoming decommissioning programme.  
 
2. Second Tier Participants – this group will be composed of those at risk 
of being caught by the extensive decommissioning regime. Such 
participants include oil & gas companies that sold their interest in the 
field, often many years ago. Second Tier Participants typically remain 
party to the DSA to ensure that sufficient ongoing security is provided 
by the First Tier Participants.  
 
3. Third Tier Participants – these are not parties to the DSA, but can, by 
agreement, enforce the terms of the DSA using benefits derived under 
the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties Act) 1999.  
 
4. Secretary of State – if there is concern that those liable for 
decommissioning will be unable to discharge their decommissioning 
obligations; the Secretary of State may, for surveillance and 
enforcement reasons, become party to the DSA.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
(b) the conveyance in the area so mentioned, by means of a pipe or system of 
pipes, of minerals got, or gas being stored or recovered, in the exercise of that right; 
and  
(c) the provision of accommodation for persons who work on or from an 
installation which is or has been maintained, or is intended to be established, for 
the carrying on of an activity falling within paragraph (a) [to (b)] or this paragraph”. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
23 
HOW DECOMMISSIONING SECURITY AGREEMENTS 
OPERATE  
 
DSAs facilitate the transfer of mature fields from established 
companies to smaller participants with limited financial recourses, by 
avoiding duplication of security. Where an interest in a field or structure is 
sold, the seller will be concerned about its continuing and perpetual liability 
to carry out decommissioning. For this reason, it is likely to require security 
from the purchaser. Oil & Gas UK has produced a standard-form DSA 
which has recently been updated to take account of Decommissioning 
Relief Deeds (DRDs), together with updated guidance notes (the DSA 
Guidance Notes) to capture industry practice.4 The Oil & Gas UK standard-
form JOA suggests that the JOA parties enter a DSA before submitting a 
development plan for the field.  
Under such DSA, each participant in a JOA will agree to pay cash or 
other types of security into a trust, held until the end of the 
decommissioning process. The share of decommissioning costs will 
usually, but not always, correspond with a participant’s participating 
interests under the JOA. 
The former Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), now 
replaced by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
(BEIS) recognises that “the over-riding aim of a DSA is to ensure that 
guaranteed funds will be available to cover the decommissioning costs at 
all times”.5 However, it remains to be seen whether BEIS and/or the parties 
to the DSA will meet this objective. Certain industry commentators are 
concerned that BEIS has failed adequately to monitor the methodology 
underpinning the amounts paid by participants under DSAs, leading to a 
historic under-provision in decommissioning security. 
  
IMPACT OF THE OIL PRICE ON DECOMMISSIONING 
SECURITY 
 
A field that was economically viable when the oil price was at US$100 
per barrel is likely, at the current oil price of US$ 30-50, to no longer be 
viable or only be viable for a significantly shorter estimated field life.  
                                                     
4 Oil and Gas UK, ‘Decommissioning Security Agreement (DSA), Updated 
October 2015 (OP021)’ available at Oil and Gas UK. www.oilandgas.uk  
5 BEIS, ‘Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations and Pipelines 
under the Petroleum Act 1998’ (Guidance Notes Version 6, March 2011), Annex 
G, paragraph 2. 
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Decommissioning security, which could previously be spread over 
numerous years of ongoing production, can now only be spread over a 
much shorter timeframe. More security has to be put aside each year. This 
is occurring at a time when oil and gas operators are under significant 
pressure from drastically reduced revenue streams. In addition to there 
being fewer years of revenue from the field from which security can be 
drawn, decommissioning may now take place far earlier than previously 
estimated.  
The recently established Oil & Gas Authority (“OGA”) and the UK 
Continental Shelf Maximising Economic Recovery (UK MER) strategy 
have only caused further uncertainty.  
UK MER6 provides as follows: 
a. in the introductory sentence: “a. all stakeholders should be obliged to 
maximise the expected net value of economic recoverable petroleum 
from relevant UK waters…c. compliance with the Strategy may oblige 
individual companies to allocate value between them, matching risk to 
reward. However, while the net result should deliver greater value 
overall, it will not be the case that all companies will always be 
individually better off…”.7 
b. under paragraph 7, defining the central obligation under UK MER: 
“Relevant persons must, in the exercise of their relevant functions, take 
the steps necessary to secure that the maximum value of economically 
recoverable petroleum is recovered from the strata beneath relevant 
UK waters.”8  
c. under paragraph 14: “In considering the configuration required by 
paragraph 13, relevant persons must give due consideration to: … b. 
whether or not any infrastructure already in existence could be used in 
such a way as to reduce costs or otherwise increase the recovery of 
economically recoverable petroleum from the region. This includes 
consideration as to whether any such infrastructure (whether proposed 
to be constructed or already in existence) could be so used if 
reasonable adjustments were to be made to it.”9  
d. under paragraph 16: “Owners and operators of infrastructure must 
ensure that it is operated in a way that facilitates the recovery of the 
                                                     
6 DECC, ‘The Maximising Economic Recovery Strategy for the UK: Presented to 
Parliament pursuant to s 9G of Petroleum Act 1998 as amended by the 
Infrastructure Act 2015’ (DECC, UK).  
7 Ibid, 2. Emphasis added. 
8 Ibid, 4. Emphasis added. 
9 Ibid, 4-5. Emphasis added. 
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maximum value of economically recoverable petroleum from (as 
applicable): a. the region in which it is situated; and b. where the 
infrastructure is used by or for the benefit of others, the regions in 
which those others are situated.”10  
e. under paragraph 20: “Before commencing the planning of 
decommissioning of any infrastructure in relevant UK waters, owners 
of such infrastructure must ensure that all viable options for their 
continued use have been suitably explored, including those which are 
not directly relevant to the recovery of petroleum such as the transport 
and storage of carbon dioxide” (emphasis added).  
f. under paragraph 22: Where the OGA produces a plan “which relates to 
the obligation in paragraph 20, it may identify particular pieces of 
infrastructure the decommissioning of which would prejudice the 
maximising of the recovery of economically recoverable petroleum in 
a region.”11  
 
It is clear from the above provisions that operators seeking to 
decommission their economically unviable assets may face barriers in 
doing so regardless of the negative impact it may have on their financial 
status. This is particularly the case for offshore infrastructure that if 
decommissioned, may result in a decommissioning domino effect on 
neighbouring installations and tie(-)ins thereby decreasing the “expected 
net value of economic recoverable petroleum from relevant UK waters”.12  
For such ‘critical’ infrastructure, what CoP date should be used? What 
would the revenues be (if any) and who should bear the costs of maintaining 
such infrastructure? Should such potential costs even be included in 
decommissioning security calculations? If so, how are they to be estimated?  
The magnified impact of decreased revenues, increased costs, short 
CoP timeframe and uncertain variables has, for the first time, caused those 
seeking to protect themselves from potential liability to carefully scrutinise 
both the current level of decommissioning security in place and the 
calculations by which the level of future security is defined.  
 
DECOMMISSIONING SECURITY DISPUTES 
 
The standard-form DSA requires that every year all of the First Tier 
Participants pay their respective share of (a) “net costs” (representing an 
amount equal to the best estimated cost of performing all decommissioning 
                                                     
10 Ibid, 5. Emphasis added. 
11 Ibid, 6. Emphasis added. 
12 Ibid, 2. 
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activities multiplied by a risk factor); less (b) “net value” (representing an 
amount equal to expected production receipts from the field) and the 
amount of security that the participant has already provided.  
Both net cost and net value are assessed on a net present value (NPV) 
basis. Where the NPV of the net cost exceeds the NPV of the net value, 
security is required to cover the difference. As production continues, the 
intention of the DSA is that the amount of security increases so that it fully 
funds decommissioning at CoP.  
As a result of prior beneficial market conditions, numerous industry 
participants consider that historically, optimistic assumptions as to future 
“net value” have been made. By making such optimistic assumptions of 
“net value”, the security required to meet estimated “net costs” has been 
less year-on-year resulting in serious under-provision of decommissioning 
security. This approach, on the part of First Tier Participants, may be 
explained by their wish to free up cash to invest in production activities or 
to reduce the asset retirement obligation required so as to leverage 
themselves further or position themselves for sale. 
Current depressed market conditions have caused Second Tier 
Participants (those benefitting from the security without paying in 
themselves) to become concerned with the adequacy of the security in 
place. Depressed production revenue due to falling oil and gas prices is 
causing Second Tier Participants to seek higher levels of security. Second 
Tier Participants that sold their interest many years ago are liable to 
contribute to decommissioning costs if the First Tier Participants default. 
Optional language under the standard-form DSA governs whether Second 
Tier Participants have a right to approve the operator’s proposals or merely 
comment on them. 
These requests for additional security from Second Tier Participants are 
coming at a time where falling revenues and increasing costs are impacting 
on First Tier Participants’ ability to provide the greater levels of security 
sought. In addition, not all of the First Tier Participants will have the same 
funding profile. Parties to a JOA may legitimately take differing positions 
on the assumptions made by the operator. This is particularly the case for 
those First Tier Participants who are highly leveraged through reserves-
based lending.  
For these new-entrant oil and gas operators, providing suitable 
estimates is, on a practical note, an unenviable task. Not only is calculating 
accurate decommissioning estimates, no matter how carefully done, not an 
exact science, but smaller oil & gas operators, who are keen to match costs 
to revenues, have also reduced investment in much needed personnel (such 
as specialist engineers) and technology (such as decommissioning 
software).  
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DECOMMISSIONING RELIEF DEEDS 
 
Issues with potential shortfalls in security are a particular problem for 
those who entered into Decommissioning Relief Deeds (DRDs). DRDs 
permit security to be provided on a post-tax basis. Security is, as a result, 
no longer being paid in at a (higher) pre-tax relief basis. Since October 
2013, when DRDs were introduced, a reduction in both any previously 
existing decommissioning security “buffer” that resulted from payments 
having been made on the (higher) pre-tax relief basis, and the absolute 
amount of security set aside has arisen. This is, unless, of course, a higher 
risk factor has been applied to net costs.  
A higher net cost risk factor, however, is unlikely to have been applied. 
First Tier Participants, incentivised to maximise cash flows, are likely, 
where possible, to have used lower risk factors, higher reserve estimates 
and other metrics to reduce the level of decommissioning security due 
under a DSA. Second Tier Participants may have been comfortable with 
lower estimates for the calculation of security due to net costs having been 
calculated on a pre-tax basis and making forward assumptions based on the 
vibrant oil and gas market at the time. The move to a post-tax calculation 
of net costs has exacerbated this historic under-provision of security. 
The recalculation and review of decommissioning security calculations 
is now being carefully monitored by both co-venturers and by Second Tier 
Participants. There has been an increase in requests for data, closer scrutiny 
of projections of “net value” and “net costs”, and a greater interest in the 
use of expert determination in the event that the participants cannot agree.  
 
DISPUTES OVER THE CALCULATION OF NET COST  
 
Net cost represents the best estimated cost of performing all 
decommissioning activities at the time at which they can be best expected 
to need to be performed. There is significant scope for disputes over this 
calculation.  
 
a. When will decommissioning occur?  
A core assumption input into the calculation of net cost is the expected 
date of decommissioning. The estimated date for decommissioning has 
a significant impact on the level of security to be provided. The hope 
that ageing infrastructure might find alternative economically viable 
uses, as some structures (particularly pipelines) could be used via 
tiebacks and brownfield developments, currently seems challenging in 
the current low oil price environment. Of course, decommissioning 
may now be delayed if such infrastructure is required by the OGA to 
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be maintained in accordance with UK MER. However, there is no 
guarantee that this will be economical.  
 
Other new technology such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) could also 
have postponed the date of decommissioning, but this is also only made 
economic by high oil prices. These possible ways to reduce net cost, 
which could have been discounted back (through the NPV calculation) 
so as to reduce the amount of security required (and also to have 
postponed the trigger date for provision of security) are unlikely to be 
viable. This is significant, because these assumptions might 
legitimately have been included in previous calculations, made when 
the oil price was higher. Disputes are arising wherever these 
assumptions are being reversed out and falling oil prices are bringing 
the expected date of decommissioning forwards. Where optimistic 
assumptions have been made, inadequate security is likely to be 
provided.  
 
b. What is the scope of decommissioning?  
 
There are many different forms of installation. Most installations will 
require an individually tailored and untested method of 
decommissioning. With so many variables, how accurate can the ‘net 
cost’ calculation be? It is common to underestimate decommissioning 
costs. For example, the decommissioning close out reports of the Fife, 
Fergus, Flora and Agnus Fields highlight that costs overran by 
approximately 20%.13  
 
Further scope exists for disputes over whether net costs should be based 
on a ‘left in place’ basis for installations capable of attaining a 
derogation (allowing the offshore installation to remain wholly or 
partly in place rather than being disposed of on land).14 Adopting this 
approach would reduce net cost. BEIS guidance suggests it is likely to 
require the decommissioning costs for large concrete structures to be 
                                                     
13 HESS, ‘Fire, Fergus, Flora and Angus Fields: Decommissioning Programmes 
Close-Out Report’ (HESS, Document No: 32 ADP -016). 
14 A limited number of installations may be eligible for derogation from the 
prohibition on the dumping, or leaving wholly or partly in place, of offshore 
installations. Derogation will only be granted where it is a preferable means of 
disposal than reuse, recycling or disposal on land. 
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estimated on this basis.15 For example, such a derogation would be 
likely for the Brent field platforms (Bravo, Charlie and Delta) which 
consist of concrete gravity-based structures (GBS) weighing 300,000 
tonnes each.16  
 
Derogations may, however, become less common due to advances in 
technology, and if this approach changes net cost may increase 
significantly.17 On the other hand, concerns about the carbon budget of 
extensive decommissioning operations, where every component is 
laboriously cut up and sorted onshore, may alternatively lead to more 
derogations being granted. It is easy to see how there is scope for 
disputes as to the most appropriate estimate to be used.  
 
c. What is the proper risk factor to apply? 
 
The Oil & Gas UK standard-form JOA provides for the use of a risk 
factor in the security calculation. This is to provide a degree of caution 
against possible rises in decommissioning costs.18 Net cost estimates 
will usually be prepared on a P50 basis. This assumes that there is an 
equal chance of there being under-spending or over spending as against 
the costs estimate. The risk factor reflects uncertainties about the net 
cost estimate. The risk factor may not always have been calculated, or 
updated, in a fully statistically rigorous manner. These uncertainties 
should reduce with time as the operator obtains a better understanding 
of these costs, and optional language in the DSA allows the 
contingency to be increased or reduced in a stepped process. Presently, 
the ease with which this variable can legitimately be changed is making 
it a target for attention and a prominent source of disputes.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 BEIS (n 6) Annex F para14.  
16 Oil & Gas UK, Activity Survey (Oil and Gas UK, 2015) 69 available at  
<http://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/EC044.pdf> accessed 9 
November 2016 
17 Oil & Gas UK, Decommissioning Security Agreement Guidance Notes (March 
2009), 38.  
18 Ibid, 39. 
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DISPUTES OVER THE CALCULATION OF NET VALUE  
 
Net value represents the best estimated production and other receipts 
from the field for so long as it is estimated that the field will remain in 
production. There is significant scope for disputes over this calculation.  
 
a. What oil and gas prices to use? 
 
Fluctuating oil prices will have a significant impact on net value. 
Regular recalculations may lead to periodic changes as oil and gas 
prices rise and fall. Assumptions as to future oil and gas prices should 
be clearly stated in the DSA.19 Published indices for oil and gas prices 
will need to be agreed. Any gas price indexation formula contained in 
any existing gas sales contract should be used when calculating future 
gas revenue.20  
 
Essential to this calculation is the date on which production will cease. 
With so many variables, even slight adjustments can give rise to very 
significant variances between the parties. Since the introduction of 
DRDs, net revenues and net costs are normally inputted on a post-tax 
basis. This includes royalties, corporation tax/supplemental charge, and 
any PRT that is applicable. Recent changes to these taxes will need to 
be taken into account. Net value does, however, also take into account 
any tax relief or grants given or expected to be given unrelated to the 
costs of decommissioning. The operator is required to perform two 
calculations, one with and one without the effect of the relief. 
 
b. What reserves data should be used? 
 
Optional language under the standard-form DSA governs whether only 
reserves estimates approved by the Joint Operating Committee 
appointed under the JOA to operate and manage the licence area are to 
be used to calculate net value, whether the operator’s best estimates, 
acting as a reasonable and prudent operator, are adequate, or other 
alternatives. 21  Commonly, newer entrants into the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) will seek to maintain the level of reported reserves. 
                                                     
19 Ibid. 
20 Oil & Gas UK (n 17) 39. However, see below in relation to concerns as to 
confidentiality. 
21 Oil & Gas UK, Industry Model Form Decommissioning Security Agreement 
(September 2013) Appendix 5 paragraph 7.10. See also Oil & Gas UK (n 17) 39. 
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There is concern that this may lead to the reserves estimate used in the 
calculation of net value being optimistic, which would result in the 
understatement of security. Without clear drafting, there is significant 
scope for disputes on these assumptions.  
 
c. How to account for tiebacks and other revenue? 
 
Many fields receive significant revenues from tariff and other receipts 
from third parties, such as tiebacks. As these form revenue from the 
field, absent express provision in the DSA to the contrary, they should 
be included. A dispute may emerge as to the degree of certainty 
required that these receipts will accrue. On one extreme, it is arguable 
these receipts should only be taken into account in situations where 
send-or-pay arrangements ensure that such tariff income is secured. On 
the other, such tariff income can be taken into account even though no 
agreement has been concluded, or where such agreement has been 
concluded but is of only a limited duration, so long as there is no other 
route to export the tieback. The standard-form DSA contains options to 
address these alternatives.22  
 
 
EXPERT DETERMINATION UNDER DECOMMISSIONING 
SECURITY AGREEMENTS 
 
Under the Oil & Gas UK’s standard-form DSA, the cost estimation 
based on the foregoing forms an important part of an operator’s 
decommissioning schedule and budget (‘the Proposed Plan’). The operator 
will submit the Proposed Plan for approval under the JOA. Disputes may 
be referred to determination by an expert, if:  
 
 the Proposed Plan submitted and/or performed by the operator is 
challenged; 
 
 the operator fails to produce the Proposed Plan or perform the cost 
estimation; or 
 
 the operator’s determination that decommissioning has been completed 
is challenged.  
 
                                                     
22 Oil & Gas UK (n 17) 19. 
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An expert is also engaged when the cost estimation performed by the 
operator needs to be independently reviewed, even where no dispute exists 
between the parties to the DSA. To address this last issue, the standard-
form DSA provides options that allow: (i) for a review of the net cost, net 
value and – where a DRD applies - PRT relief, calculations by an expert at 
regular intervals; or, alternatively, (ii) to have less frequent reviews initially 
followed by annual reviews later in the field life. A provision that a review 
is triggered if the operator believes that there has been a change in net cost 
or net value over an agreed tolerance may also be included. The likely time 
scales for these steps?]  
 
a. Identifying the right expert 
 
As decommissioning involves a variety of specialised and technical 
stages, any expert chosen may need assistance from multiple specialist 
disciplines such as reservoir engineering, offshore engineering, process 
engineering, drilling, subsea contractors, heavy-lift/barge contractors 
and disposal/refurbishment contractors. The standard-form DSA 
provides for this and allows the expert to obtain technical and legal 
advice. 
 
If multiple expert disciplines are engaged, the expert will need to rely 
on and assess the views of several other experts, not just rely on his 
own qualifications and experience. These views would all need to have 
been commissioned23, provided to and then considered by the expert 
before the preliminary decision can be released. Delay in any of the 
technical elements would prevent further progress.  
 
It may also be hard for the parties to have confidence that the expert 
even with this technical assistance, can manage all technical and 
procedural aspects. This is particularly the case if any party is seeking 
to elongate the process, for example by referring the expert to greater 
and greater volumes of documents that are said to be relevant as, 
without express direction from the expert, time bars to control or 
prevent this will not exist. 
 
In the construction industry, where multiple specialisms are often 
required, a trend towards the appointment of legally qualified 
adjudicators rather than those with engineering qualifications has 
                                                     
23 Commissioned by the expert (normally with the approval of the parties in 
dispute). 
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evolved. Given the similarities, it shall be seen whether the offshore 
decommissioning industry finds it preferable to appoint a legally 
trained expert possessing relevant UKCS decommissioning experience, 
who can request technical assistance from relevant disciplines. The 
legal and procedural expertise, for example familiarity with hearing the 
parties, determining questions about admissibility of documents, 
setting submission deadlines and weighing up competing evidence may 
be preferable to assist good governance of the procedure in complex 
multiple disciplinary cases.  
 
b. Appointment of the expert  
 
Following any required negotiations stipulated in the DSA, a reference 
to an expert can be made. For challenges to the Proposed Plan (but not 
for other challenges), the standard-form DSA limits the right to refer 
the matter to the expert to the party objecting to the Proposed Plan (the 
“Objecting Party”). This might present difficulties for the operator who 
would not appear to have the right to refer the matter to the expert 
should the Objecting Party fail to do so nor absent either unanimity 
between the parties or determination by the expert, should the Proposed 
Plan become approved. It may be necessary to apply to the court for an 
order that the Objecting Party refer the matter to the expert or, in 
default, be deemed to have done so. Conversely, under the standard-
form DSA only the operator and not the other parties to the DSA can 
submit the cost estimation for independent periodic review. However, 
if the operator upon notice to do so fails promptly to comply, any other 
party to the DSA may itself refer the cost calculation to the expert.  
 
The standard-form DSA contains options for appointment of the expert; 
either the expert is selected by unanimous vote of the parties to the DSA 
or each party to the DSA will nominate three candidates who are ready, 
willing and able to act. Those candidates will then be scored by all 
parties to the DSA in order of preference. The expert need not be an 
individual person – a firm or company can be appointed and the expert 
may not have “any financial or personal interest in the result”. This 
restriction is very wide and does not allow for nominal shareholdings 
or for the expert to have financial connections to the parties. Coupled 
with the absence of immunity from suit, this may deter acceptance of 
the appointment. Many candidates with experience of 
decommissioning are likely to work for the main offshore contractors 
and connections to some of the parties in dispute may be probable. If 
agreement on the selection of the expert is not possible within 10 
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business days, the standard-form DSA allows any party to the DSA to 
apply to the President of the Energy Institute to appoint the expert. The 
Energy Institute is a reliable and effective appointing authority. 
  
c. The scope of the expert’s power 
 
Expert determinations, despite being capable of quickly and effectively 
resolving technical disputes, do not without specific provisions to the 
contrary require:  
 
 adherence to rules of natural justice such as the right to a hearing;  
 
 the expert to come to decisions within (rather than outside) the 
range suggested by the conflicting parties; or 
 
 the expert to be independent of the parties.  
 
Unless agreed otherwise, which for obvious reasons it often is, 
decisions of experts are binding even in the presence of fraud or 
manifest error. Decisions of experts are also binding in instances where 
the expert sets about answering the wrong question. This introduces a 
degree of uncertainty in the process. The standard-form DSA seeks to 
limit this, by requiring that an Objecting Party express a stated written 
objection. In any challenge to the Proposed Plan (but not the operator’s 
determination of completion of decommissioning), the expert must 
consider and determine this area of concern. The expert cannot step 
beyond the scope of this challenge in order to re-determine other 
elements. Limiting the expert in such a way also seeks to limit the cost 
of the expert process. In practice, parties may seek to raise additional 
statements of objections at a later stage in proceedings. Judicious use 
of the expert’s power to control the procedure of the determination will 
be necessary in deciding whether supplemental statements of 
objections are permissible and within what time frame.  
 
d. Procedural matters for determination by the expert 
 
The standard-form DSA suggests that the parties to the DSA agree 
carefully defined assumptions which the operator must apply in 
drawing up the Proposed Plan and which the expert must also follow. 
These may be contentious and will be subject to individual negotiation 
between the parties to the DSA. In addition to the assumptions, it is 
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common practice in expert determinations for an expert and all those 
appointing him to sign terms of reference further specifying the 
expert’s obligations and remuneration.  
 
In relation to documents, a significant hurdle to overcome in practice is 
the task of supporting the operator’s assumptions with corroborative 
material, much of which will be confidential. Revealing information 
about gas sales prices and day rates to other industry participants might 
also infringe competition law. Unlike arbitration, it is not fatal to the 
integrity of an expert determination for the parties in dispute to agree 
to provide documents to the expert without copies to other parties; 
however this may not be an ideal solution in many cases due to such 
unilateral communications undermining confidence in the fairness of 
the expert process. 
 
e. Timing  
 
Very speedy determination is envisaged under the standard-form DSA. 
It is desirable for any reference to the expert to be completed in time to 
allow security to be replaced before existing security expires otherwise, 
interim invoices may need to be raised. The expert must notify the 
operator of his preliminary decision within 30 business days of 
acceptance of his appointment. The parties will then be given 10 
business days to make representations. The expert must, having taken 
account of such representations, reach his final decision within 30 days 
of notification of his preliminary decision to the operator.  
There is potential for references to an expert to have a very broad scope. 
The timings envisaged may not, however, be feasible, particularly for 
large or multi-installation assets, or for the review of the first cost 
estimation for the installation.  
 
f. The expert’s determination 
 
The determination can be valid even if only a simple value or date (as 
appropriate) is determined, unless a reasoned determination has been 
agreed to be given. If the expert determines that greater security be paid 
than estimated by the operator, that additional security is required to be 
paid. 
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g. Costs of the expert determination 
 
Options exist in the standard-form DSA for payment of the expert’s 
fees and expenses depending on the nature of the dispute being referred. 
The starting premise, however, is that the Objecting Party pays. Options 
also exist in relation to the recovery of a party’s own legal and other 
costs, which will be the subject of individual negotiation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Decommissioning security is becoming a topic of increased concern. 
Given current market conditions, unexpected levels of additional 
decommissioning security may significantly impact participants’ financial 
capabilities. This is particularly in respect of highly leveraged new entrants. 
There is much scope for disagreement over the amount of security that 
is contractually required. Uncertainty surrounding the accuracy of the 
variables involved in calculating decommissioning security has increased 
due to the fall in market prices. Participants are more likely to take different 
positions on the inputs and accuracy of all the variables involved.  
Larger and smaller participants may now have diverging incentives. 
The ability of many participants to access the necessary funding is in doubt. 
Sensitive commercial negotiations are being undertaken, and securing the 
unanimous approval from all First and Second Tier Participants of the 
amounts of decommissioning security to be paid is now harder to achieve. 
All this is resulting in the dispute resolution procedures governing 
decommissioning security being put to the test. 
